Rank reversal is a common phenomenon in decision making. Rank reversal occurs when a new alternative is added to (or removed from) a set of alternatives, which causes change in the ranking order of the alternatives. This paper studies the possible causes of rank reversal in reciprocal preference relation based on additive consistency. Our investigation reveals that inconsistency of information is the main cause of this phenomena in preference relations followed by ranking score aggregation. We propose score aggregation methods to address the phenomenon of rank reversal. The proposed methods are illustrated using numerical examples.
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Investigating Rank Reversal in Preference Relation
Introduction
Multi-Criteria Decision-making (MCDM) is a field with many strengths, among which is its ability to assist decision-makers in solving difficult decisions involving conflicting criteria and to help them learn more about their preferences. However, some methods are known to exhibit a phenomenon called rank reversal. Rank reversal occurs when a new alternative is added to (or removed from) a set of alternatives, which causes a change in the ranking order of the alternatives (Barzilai & Golany, 1994) . The literature on decision-making reveals that a number of methods suffer from this phenomenon. Some of them are Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) The rank reversal phenomenon has raised concerns against the use of affected methods, especially AHP. Rank reversal could be of two types: partial or total. Partial rank reversal happens to limited alternatives while other alternatives still have the same ordering. For example, suppose that the current ranking of three alternatives is , such that alternative is preferred over alternative and respectively. However, when a new alternative , which is not dominant, is introduced, the ranking could become . Notice that alternative now becomes second while alternative is first. This is called partial rank reversal. On the other hand, total rank reversal is the same as the partial rank reversal except that 4 the whole ranking order is reversed. In this case, the best alternative becomes the worst and the worst becomes the best (Dymova et al., 2013 ; Garcia-Cascales & Lamata, 2012). Belton and Gear (1983) were the first to notice this phenomenon in AHP. Since then, the literature of MCDM has been in debate about the impact of this phenomenon, and the validity of the affected methods. Many researchers such as Dyer (1990) , Schenkerman (1994) , Perez (1995) , This phenomenon could drive some decision-makers away from using methods known to have rank reversal, even if they are well-known. For instance, recently Anbaroglu et al. (2014) chose to use the Weighted Product Model (WPM) instead of relying on well-known and widely used models such as AHP and WSM just because it does not suffer from any kind of rank reversal issues. Furthermore, they commented on the problem of rank reversal as "a serious limitation" of the MCDM field, which could lead researchers to misunderstand the difference between examined alternatives. Therefore, a need for handling this phenomenon is necessary, at least for the experts who are not in favor of it. The literature on preference relations, especially 5 multiplicative preference relations, links this phenomenon to the inconsistency of the data, the concept of pairwise comparison on which preference relations are based, the preference aggregation method, and the score aggregation method. To our knowledge, there is no complete study yet that investigates these three possible reasons for rank reversal in preference relations.
There is one study, conducted by Leskinen and Kangas (2005) , on the inconsistency of pairwise comparison based on a regression model. They concluded that inconsistency could lead to rank reversal. This phenomenon, however, does not occur when there is single criterion. But, in multiple criteria even if the data are consistent, the aggregation method (i.e. arithmetic mean) can result in rank reversals.
In this paper, our goal is to investigate how inconsistency and aggregation methods could lead to rank reversal in fuzzy preference relations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we present some preliminary knowledge on preference relations. In section 3, we present a review of rank reversal literature regarding possible causes and attempts to solve rank reversal. In section 4, we study the possible causes of rank reversal in preference relation, namely, inconsistency of preference relation, aggregation operators, and score aggregation method and their link to rank reversal. In section 5, we propose score aggregation methods that have better performance than the sum normalization methods in avoiding rank reversal. In section 6, we provide a numerical example. Finally in section 7, we present the conclusions. . where is interpreted as the ratio of the preference intensity of the alternative to .
Preliminary Knowledge
There are several numerical scales for the multiplicative preference relation; however, the most popular one is the 1-9 Saaty scale. means that alternative and are indifferent;
implies that alternative is preferred to . As the ratio of intensity of increases, the stronger is the preference intensity of over . Thus, means that alternative is absolutely preferred to .
The multiplicative preference relation is called consistent if the following multiplicative transitivity is satisfied (Saaty, 1980) : .
The AHP method, which uses multiplicative preference relations, decomposes complex problems into a hierarchy consisting of several levels, where the top level represents the goal and the lower levels consist of criteria, sub-criteria and alternatives respectively. The elements in each level are compared with each other through pair-wise comparison on a scale of 1-9 to find their relative importance. Then the weight for each element is computed using the eigenvector method. The same technique is used at the lower level with respect to a higher level element to find their relative importance (Saaty, 1980 ). 
Literature Review
The purpose of this section is to explore the literature of MCDM to investigate possible causes of rank reversal phenomena. We will then cover the attempts of researchers to solve this issue.
Thus, two main subsections will be explored: the literature of rank reversal causes and attempts to fix rank reversal.
The literature on rank reversal causes'
The literature on multiplicative preference relations, especially AHP, discusses three possible reasons behind rank reversal, see Table 1 Other researchers like Schenkerman (1994) believed that the rank reversal in AHP is caused by normalization, and its scales seem arbitrary. He claimed that criteria weights are dependent on 9 the measurements of the alternatives. Thus, any change in the number of alternatives and normalization imposes revising of the criteria weights. Correspondingly, Ishizaka and Labib (2011) claimed that the rank reversal phenomenon is related to the method rather than modeling procedure and it may not be resolved because aggregation of the standardized units is not simply interpretable, which has been even disputed by French school. Lai (1995) pointed out that rank reversal happens because of multiplying criteria weights by unrelated normalized scale of performance ratings. Dyer (1990) claimed that the problem is not just rank reversal but the AHP results are arbitrary. This is because the criteria weights may not be right due to the normalization procedure. Triantaphyllou (2001) agreed with Dyer that in AHP or any additive variants of it, ranking is arbitrary often which tends to generate rank reversal even if the data is perfectly consistent. According to Rosenbloom (1997) , researchers tried to resolve this problem in AHP by proposing different normalization methods. Perez (1995) argued that the phenomenon of rank reversal is common in almost all of ordinal aggregation methods such as AHP. He claimed that rank reversal could be avoided if both criteria weights and performance ratings are generated from a common space of scales. On the other hand, Bana e Costa and Vansnick (2008) blamed the eigenvalue method. They stated that the priority vector violates a condition of order preservation, which makes use of AHP in decision-making very problematic. 
Attempts to fix rank reversal
The rank reversal phenomenon in AHP was initially observed by Belton and Gear in 1983 after they discovered that introducing a new similar alternative to the existing ones could reverse the ranking of the alternatives. They proposed a modified normalization method to overcome the rank reversal issue in the original AHP, which is later known as a Revised AHP. The revised method differs from the original AHP prioritization method where each criterion is divided by the max value with respect to it for all the alternatives. Later on, this method came to be known as the ideal model. Afterwards, Schenkerman (1994) claimed that in methods such as Referenced AHP, normalization to maximum entry (ideal model), normalization to minimum entry, and linking pins avoid rank reversal only when the criteria are quantitative. On the other hand, Saaty (1987) linked rank reversal with the existence of near or similar copies within the set of alternatives. To solve this issue, either the set of alternatives has to be revised or more criteria need to be considered. Saaty defines a near copy as an alternative that has close values within 10% for overall criteria. However, Dyer (1990) later criticized this suggestion.
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Lootsma (1993), followed by , claimed that using a geometric mean aggregation method in AHP helps to avoid rank reversal. Likewise, Ishizaka and Labib (2011) mentioned that using geometric mean in AHP prevents rank reversal since geometric mean in both row and column approaches produces the same results, unlike eigenvector methods. Barzilai and Golany (1994) graphical approach for rank reversal detection and analysis. They claimed that this graphical approach increases the level of confidence in the results. However, they mentioned that the graphical approach is not suitable when large set of criteria is under consideration. Table 2 summarizes the attempts to avoid/solve rank reversal in AHP. 
Mathematical Investigation of Rank Reversal Causes in Preference Relations
The literature reveals (summarized on Table 
Additive consistency
From two other formulations can be generated based on the characteristics of the reciprocal rule, , as follows:
Proposition 1: Let be a fuzzy preference relation, then for every preference degree on we can find its estimation based on the additive consistency through:
Proof: by taking the average of equations , and for for alternatives, the following equation is generated:
For a reciprocal fuzzy preference relation, can be re-written as:
Definition 4: Let a given reciprocal fuzzy preference relation and be the estimated fuzzy preference relation calculated by . Then the consistency degree of is calculated by Thus, is used to check the consistency degree of any reciprocal fuzzy preference relation.
When then is perfectly consistent; keeping in mind that is a preference degree or preference intensity of alternative over alternative .
The additive consistency implies dependency between alternatives, which is clear from the transitivity property. Thus, any change in the examined set of the alternatives implies a possible change on the preference degrees. This is correct, especially if the provided information is not perfectly consistent. To illustrate this, let us assume that the provided information for a set of alternatives is perfectly consistent. Then, if we remove an alternative from the set , or if we add an alternative to the set, . should we handle acceptably inconsistent information in a way to avoid rank reversal? Saaty (1980) suggested that the acceptable inconsistency (consistency ratio) should be less than 10%.
Later, Saaty (1994) suggested another 5% acceptable inconsistency level for 3x3 preference relation and 8% for 4x4 preference relation. Aguaron and Moreno-Jiménez (2003) followed Saaty's threshold suggestion and come up with 10% threshold for inconsistency measure for Geometric Mean Method. However, it seems there is no clear answer as to when a preference relation is considered to be inconsistent (Ishizaka and Labib, 2011). where is the weight of decision-maker such that , is the given preference degree by decision-maker , is the number of decision-makers, and is the collective preference degree. The weighted averaging operator becomes an averaging operator when the decision-makers have equal weights.
Aggregation methods
Proposition 2:
Let be a reciprocal fuzzy preference relation given by a decisionmaker . When all s are perfectly consistent then the collective preference relation is also perfectly consistent.
Proof: from 21 
and from then
Similarly, when an arithmetic mean operator is used, the consistency is also maintained. To illustrate this, first we define the following score aggregation method, which is called the sum
Proof: from then
where is the score of alternative and . The higher the score of an alternative, the better it is. Example 1: Suppose a decision-maker provides his assessments for one criterion on four alternatives using following reciprocal fuzzy preference relation:
Based on the consistency degree of this preference relation is 82%. By using the following ranking scores are generated:
However, when alternative is removed, the consistency degree increases to 87% with the following ranking scores: This preference relation is 100% consistent and yields following ranking scores using :
When is removed, the consistency degree is still 100%. Likewise, the ranking order is:
There is no rank reversal because is satisfied .
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Proposed Score Aggregation Methods
Based on these results, the only way to ensure ranking order is free of rank reversal in the preference relations is by ensuring that the preference relation(s) is perfectly consistent.
However, to some extent this is hard to achieve in real world problems, especially in a group decision-making environment where there is a tradeoff between consistencies and consensus (Herrera-Viedma et al., 2007a). Thus, we need to handle rank reversal when it is not desirable by maintaining some guidelines that deal with the dependency of the data/information. Here we present three scenarios that are possible to happen to the set of alternatives during the decision process: a new alternative is introduced, an existing alternative is removed, or a new one replaces an alternative.
Note: This is only applied if the set of alternatives have been modified.
Proposition 4:
The following formulation does better than the sum normalization method in avoiding rank reversal in reciprocal preference relations when a new alternative, , is introduced:
where is the estimated preference degree calculated by . 
Proof:
Similar to the proof of the previous proposition.
Proposition 6:
The following formulation prevents rank reversal from occurring in reciprocal preference relations when an alternative, , is removed:
, when then
Thus if we divide both sides by any constant greater than zero, the inequality will not be affected. Therefore, we divide both sides by since is always less than , where is the number of alternatives of the original problem. We get:
, and this formulation also ensures maintaining the sum of the scores of the alternatives at 1,
Numerical Example
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Suppose that four decision-makers provide their assessments (by fuzzy preference relations) on four alternatives as follows:
After several rounds of discussion, they reach an acceptable level of consensus, which results in the following collective preference relation, which has been aggregated by a weighted averaging operator assuming equal weights for decision-makers:
This preference relation is 95% consistent. If we calculate the ranking score by the sum normalization method , then we get the following ranking order:
.
A. Adding a new alternative
Now consider that the decision-makers introduce a new alternative . Going through the consensus process, they end up with the following collective preference relation:
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The consistency degree of this preference relation has dropped to 78.5% and the new ranking order by is:
Notice that by introducing , which is a non-dominant alternative, the ranking order for the first two alternatives has reversed. This is because the collective preference relation is not perfectly consistent and thus, there is no guarantee that and are satisfied.
However, if we apply , which relies on improving the consistency of the added alternative, we get the following ranking order:
This ranking order is similar to the original problem except that alternative has been placed in its right ranking position among the alternatives.
B. Replacing an alternative
Now, let us consider that alternative has been replaced by in the original problem. The collective preference relation is 81% consistent for the collective preference relation below:
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The following are the ranking orders obtained by the sum normalization method and the proposed formula , respectively:
Obtained by :
Note that both methods generate the same ranking order but with different score values.
C. Removing an alternative
Consider Example 1 again,
Where the preference relation is 82% consistent and has the following ranking order, by :
We saw that when alternative is removed, the consistency degree increases but the ranking order has reversed between the first and the second:
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However, if we apply we get the following ranking order:
which is consistent with the ranking order of the original problem.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have proved that consistency of the data/information is the main cause of rank reversal in preference relation. Also, we have shown that when the preference relations are perfectly consistent then neither a weighted averaging aggregation operator nor an arithmetic mean aggregation operator could cause rank reversal. This is also true for the score aggregation operator, particularly, the sum normalization method. However, when the preference relation is inconsistent, which is usually the case in real life decision problems, then the score aggregation operator could generate rank reversal when the set of alternatives is modified. Thus, we proposed modified score aggregation operators that could be used when a change in the set of alternatives is done. The proposed score aggregation operators integrate the consistency element to reduce the chances of rank reversal. We show that the proposed operators perform better than the sum normalization method in avoiding rank reversal when a change happens in the set of alternatives.
This work was based on additive consistency in reciprocal preference relation. As future work, we would like to extend this work to preference relation based on multiplicative consistency.
Multiplicative consistency is as important as additive consistency. Moreover, we would like to
